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THE REQUIREMENT OF DELIVERY IN GIFTS IN KENTUCKY
A gift tnter-vzvos or causa mortis is generally said to consist of: (1) intention
of the donor to give, (2) deliverv, and (3) acceptance by the donee. Of these
three the requirement of delivery gives the greatest difficulty. This difficulty
usually anses where the donor wishes to make a gift of certain personal property
and fails to meet the time-honored requirements of delivery. In such cases the
courts are confronted with the dilemma of wishing to give effect to the donor s
express intention to transfer his property and the conflicting desire to adhere to
the established rules of law.
The purpose of this note is to examine the Kentucky decisions concerning the
doctrine of delivery and to offer a possible solution to the problems rinsed by the
requirement of delivery. Perhaps the examination can be implemented at the
outset by (1) a brief discussion of the historical development of the doctrine
with its modem variations and (2) an evaluation of the doctrine as to its mod-
em purpose.
The doctrine as it applies to the law of gifts is thought to have had its in-
ception in the common law concept of ownerslup and the common laws insis-
tence upon a manual "tradition" and livery of seisin. If one wished to transfer
title or ownership to property it was necessary that he deliver up possession to the
transferee. This was accomplished in the case of real property by livery of seism
and in personal property by a manual "tradition" of the chattel which was an
actual transfer of physical possession of the chattel from the transferor to the
transferee. This rule applied whether the transfer was a gift or a sale.3
Almost from the beginmng this strict rule became subject to two well defined
exceptions. The courts early recogmzed that delivery of an instrument under
seal, purporting to pass title would effect a gift of chattels4 The reason for this
exception is obscure' and the theory for upholding such transfers today in those
jurisdictions which have abolished the seal is in dispute.' The second exception
recognized that title could be passed by the delivery of some effective means of
acquiring or coming into the use of the chattel. This type of delivery, known
as a "constructive delivery," was at first confined to those cases where the physical
bulk of the chattel made an actual transfer of possession impracticable or Un-
possible. This exception was gradually broadened and came to include those
cases where the subject matter of the gift though capable of an actual delivery
Was impossible because it was not present or was inaccessible at the time the
words of gift were spoken.' Generally speaking, these situations prescribed the
field of delivery and from them the courts developed the test, that title by way
of gift could pass only where the delivery, whether actual or constructive, was
such as to absolutely deprive the donor of domimon and control and confer it
'BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY see. 87 (1936).
" PoLLocK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAV 180, 181 (2d ed. 1924).
'WILLISTON, SALES see. 350 (Rev. ed. 1948).
'Cochrane v. Moore, 252 Q.B.D. 57 (1890).
HoxaswoRnT, A HIsToRY OF ENGLISH LAW 357, 358 (3d ed. 1927).
'Roberts, The Necessity of Delivery in Gifts, 32 W VA. L. Rv. 313, 316
(1926).
'Ward v. Turner, 2 Ves. S. R. 441, 443, 24 Eng. Rep. 275, 282 (CH 1752).
'Rule v. Fleming, 85 Ind. App. 487, 152 N. E. 181 (1926); Gilkson v. Third
Ave. R. R. Co. 47 App. Div. 472, 63 N. Y. Supp. 792 (1900). For a discussion
of how this rule has been extended in other respect see BROwN, supra note 1, sec.
42 and the cases there cited.
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upon the donee.' Hence, in those cases where the donor continued to exercise
dommion over the gift or where it was subject to his future control the gift would
theoretically fail for want of delivery. This classical test for a valid delivery has
continued to thread its way through the cases and it is quoted with approval today.10
The strictness of the classical test has been relaxed in those jurisdictions which
recogmze the symbolic delivery. In these jurisdictions it is possible for the donor
to pass title to a chattel by the delivery of a token which symbolizes or represents
the subject of the gift. This differs from an actual delivery in that the possession
of the thing is not actually transferred from the donor to the donee. At most, all
that passes is title to the chattel with a corresponding right in the donee of taking
possession. The symbolic delivery also differs from the constructive delivery
since the tlung delivered need not be a means of acquiring or coming into the
use of the chattel but it is sufficient if it represents or symbolizes the chattel to
the donor.n In these cases it is clear that no possession is actually transferred
and that the donor still has it within his power to exercise dominion over the gift.
While the exercise of such dominion may be wrongful, the symbolic delivery does
not put it beyond is power to do so as an actual or constructive delivery
would do.
The writers today seem to feel that the doctrine of delivery serves a two
fold purpose. First, it impresses upon the donor the significance of his act and
prevents him from making a gift in a heedless or unguarded moment. Secondly,
it gives the donee at least prima facie evidence that a gift was made and provides
the court with clear and convincing proof that the donor intended to pass title
to the chattel.' The reason most frequently given for requiring delivery is that
it tends to prevent the assertion of false and spurious claims.' The courts feel
that in gift transactions the opportunity for fraud is great and therefore all such
claims are to be viewed with caution, especially where the gift is first asserted
after the donor s death."0 Thus, in requiring a delivery the courts are merely
assuring themselves that the donee has a valid claim and that the donor intended
his act to pass title to the chattel. If these are the true reasons for continuing to
require a delivery it would seem to follow that any other method which achieves
these ends should be acceptable to effect a gift. Unfortunately this is not the
law. 5 In view of the fact that our legal system clearly recognizes that an mdi-
vidual owner has a right to dispose of his unencumbered property as he sees fit,
the general policy of the courts should be to give effect to the intentional exercise
of that right. In a great many cases, however, the courts have defeated the
'Brewers Admr. v. Brewer, 181 Ky. 400, 205 S.W 393 (1918).
"Pikeville Nat'l Bank v. Shirley, 281 Ky. 150, 135 S.W 2d 426 (1939).'BROWN, supra note 1, sec. 41 at 92, 93. The language used in some of the
cases seems to indicate that some courts fail to make a distinction between con-
structive and symbolic delivery and treat them as the same thing.
Gulliver and Tilson, Classification of Gratutious Transfers, 51 YALE L. J.
1, 3, 4 (1941). Mecham, The Requirements of Delivery in Action Evidenced by
Commercial Instruments, 21 ILL. L. REv. 341, 348, 349 (1926).
" Gulliver and Tilson, Supra note 11, at 3. ("The fact that our judicial
agencies are remote from the actual or fictitious occurences relied on by the
various claimants to the property, and so must accept second hand information,
perhaps ambigious, perhaps innocently misleading, perhaps deliberately falsified,
seems to furnish the chief justification for requirements of transfer beyond evidence
of oral statements of intent.")
"Hays Admr. v. Patrick, 266 Ky. 713, 99 S.W 2d 805 (1936).
'Dickerson v. Snyder, 209 Ky. 212, 272 S.W 384 (1925).
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donor s undisputed intention to make a gift solely on the grounds that he had not
complied with the technical requirements of delivery' The wisdom of such a
rule is to be doubted in those situations where there is no danger of fraud and
where it is clear that the donor intended to make a present gratutious transfer
of his property.
The early Kentucky decisions almost without exception adhere to the classi-
cal formula, and require an absolute surrender of dominion and control.' Ken-
tucky also recognizes the symbolic delivery and while most of these cases have
dealt with the gift of a chose in action it is reasonable to believe that they might
be extended to cover the gift of other personal property. In the leading case of
Stephenson s Adm r. v. King,"8 the court sustained a gift cause mortis where the
donor delivered to the donee a letter from the donor s attorney describing a note
and a bond which the attorney held for the donor and which were the object of
the gift. In that case the donor had made repeated statements that she wished
the donee to have everything she owned and on the day before her death gave
the letter to the donee telling her to get her money on the paper. To defeat the
gift in this case would have meant that the entire estate would pass to the donor s
son who had disowned the donor as his mother. The court said,
"No other delivery could have been made there is
no reason why the intention to give, with the actual delivery of the
written evidence of the right to the thing under the belief of
the donor that it perfects the gift, should not be held to constitute a
valid gift causa mortis."
The court has also held that the delivery of a book of accounts is a good
symbolic delivery of the debt evidenced by the accounts and may be recovered
as such.' In McCoy s Adm r. v. McCoy," the court by way of dictum said that
delivery of a checking account passbook would effect a gift of the fund on deposit.
This holding was approved by later decisions and is now the settled law of this
state.2-
In line with these cases it might be well to note that Kentucky allows a gift
of personal property to be made by delivering to the donee a written instrument
sBrewers Adin r. v. Brewer, supra note 9.
'Pages Admr. v. Page, 1 Ky. Op. 385 (1866).
81 Ky. 425 (1883).
'Id. at 435.
'Jones Adnr. v. Moore, 102 Ky. 591, 44 S.W 126 (1898).
21126 Ky. 783, 104 S.W 1031 (1907). It might also be noted that the Ken-
tucky court finds a valid gift of a savings account without a delivery of the pass-
book where the donor deposits money in the donee s name, provided that the donor
intended to make a gift of the deposit and that the donee accepted it as a gift.
See Collins v. Collins Admr., 242 Ky. 5, 45 S.W 2d 811 (1931). In view of
the fact that the passbook must be presented whenever a withdrawal is made, the
completeness of such a delivery might be questioned. cf Ruffalo v. Savage, 252
Wis. 175, 31 N.W 2d 175 (1948).
'Grays Adm r. v. Dixon, 255 Ky. 239, 73 S.W 2d 6 (1934). It is interest-
ing to note that these decisions upholding a symbolic delivery of a chose in action
are in direct conflict with the accepted contract rules of gratutious assignments.
According to RESTATEMENT, CONTRACrs see. 158 (1) (b) in order to make a
gratutious assignment of a chose in action it is necessary to deliver to the donee
a tangible token, which not only evidences the chose but is essential to its enforce-
ment. It is suggested that the delivery of a tangible token is a true constructive
delivery, and that the cases cited above are examples of a true symbolic delivery
of the chose.
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purporting to pass title to the property.' It is possible in this situation that the
subject of the gift is capable of an actual physical transfer. It would seem that
in upholding such a gift the court does so primarily because the donor s intention
is clearly expressed and not because he has surrendered all dominion and control.
There are certain other situations where the court has seen fit to sustain a
gift where there was in fact no actual, constructive, or symbolic delivery. In
Brown v. Browns Adms.,' the donor was the father of two illegitimate sons'and
as a service to them became a surety on their promissory note. Before the note
was due and without being asked to do so, the father paid the note and took it
into his possession. On many occasions both before and after he paid the ilote,
he told several persons that he intended the money as a gift to his sons and that
he wished to see them and give them the note for fear they would never get it m
case he died. The note was never delivered to the sons and after the fathers
death the note was found among his papers. The court found there was a valid
gift and a good delivery saying,
. the delivery must be according to the nature of the tung, and
an actual delivery so far as the subject is capable of delivery.
The payment of the money in discharge of the note, we think, con-
stituted the gift; the act was complete when the money was paid,
if paid, as we have assumed, as a gift. The donor had parted
with the possession of the thing, and with control and dominion
over it; he could not recall the money paid nor change the nature of
the act. To render the gift perfect, it was not necessary to deliver
the note to the donees."
The court admits that there was no actual delivery in this case and it is diffi-
cult to find any sort of a delivery in the usual sense of the word since nothing
tangible passed from the donor to the donees or to a third person as agent for
them. Neither can it be assumed that the donor put it beyond his dominion and
control to enforce a right of action against the donees. The donor continued
to hold the note and doubtlessly could have enforced it if he had so wished.
Therefore it follows that the donor did not put the money beyond recall since he
could have collected a like sum from the donees. The court here has seen fit to
disregard the retention of control by the donor and find a valid gift where all
the elements of a classical delivery were not met.
In the rather unique case of Simmons v. Simmons,' the donor had been cared
for by her son for many years. As a token of her appreciation she desired to make
her son a gift of a promissory note wich he had previously made to her. On
many occasions she expressed this intention and frequently said that all she had
belonged to him. The note in question was not in the donor s possession, but was
in the hands of her daughter who refused to surrender it although asked to do so.
After the donor s death the daughter turned the note over to the administrator'
who attempted to enforce it against the son. The court held that there had
been a valid gift of the note, since the donor had done all that she could do. The
court said that to defeat the gift, " would be to exalt form above substance
Taylor v. Purdy, 151 Ky. 82, 151 S.W 45 (1912) (notes); Weber v. Salis-
bury, 149 Ky. 827, 148 S.W 34 (1912) (gift of bank deposit by delivery of a
written order); Gordon v. Youngs Admr. 10 Ky. L. R. 681 (188) (livestock).
'43 Ky. (4 B. Mon.) 535 (1844).
Id. at 537.
138 Ky. 493, 118 S.W 304 (1909).
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and to prostitute a rule of law to defeat the purpose for winch it was intended."
Clearly, ths case demonstrates that under certain conditions where intention is
undisputed the court will disregard delivery as an element of the gift and look
entirely to the evidence of the donor s intention.
In Farris v. Farrts,' the donor expressed Ins intention to his nephev to make
him a gift of certain stock which was in his safety deposit box. The keys to the
box were in the possession of the donor s attorney and the nephew informed the
attorney of his uncle s intention. The attorney took the stock from the box with
the intention of turning it over to the nephew when told to do so by the donor.
By inadvertence the certificate was placed back in the vault and could not be
obtained until the next day. Upon being informed of ths fact and asked if he
still wished Ins nephew to have the stock the donor nodded his head. A short
time later he provided for this disposition of the stock in his will. Although the
will was effective, the stock would not have passed to the nephew under it since
the estate was subject to an antenuptial agreement which would have depleted
the estate and left nothing to-pass by the will. The court found that there was
a valid gift inter vvos saying that the donor had parted with all dominion and
control and that the attorney took as trustee for the nephew. While it is true that
delivery may be made to a third party for the donee, it is equally true in this case
that the attorney is also the agent of the donor and subject to his direction and
control. Since as a general rule possession of the agent is possession of the
principal, it is difficult to see how the donor has surrendered control in this case.
Another instance of relaxed delivery may be observed in Scherztnger v. Scher-
zmger." In that case the donor being near death wished to give Ins wife his prop-
erty before he died. He called an attorney and deeded hIs real property to Ins
wife and expressed the intention to give her certan money which was on deposit
in hIs name in a checking account and a savings account. A few days later he
had Ins wife s name added to the checking account and attempted to add her
name to the savings account. The bank inforned him that it was necessary for
Ins wife to sign a certificate of deposit before this step could be taken. After re-
peating hIs intention to make the gift in the presence of his daughter the donor
handed his wife the certificate of deposit and said, "Mother, I am giving you tis
certificate of deposit, I want you to take it to the bank and have your name added."
The court said,
"Furthermore, it has been pointed out that the proof shows
his intention to make such a gift. We think also that the circum-
stances heretofore reviewed show clearly that there was delivery of
the money in the two accounts in the bank from the deceased to Ins
wife. These conditions and circumstances are ample, in our opinion,
to support the gift as a gift causa mortis, notwithstanding the appel-
lant's contention that the deceased had the right to write checks on
his bank account after the gift was made." '
Clearly, these actions by the donor do not fit the classical test for a valid
delivery. This was not the best delivery under the circumstances since the donor
could have made a gift of the entire account by delivering the passbooks or by
" Id. at 499, 118 S.W at 306.269 Ky. 466, 107 S.W 2d 299 (1937).
280 Ky. 44, 132 S.W 2d 537 (1939).30Id. at 50, 132 S.W 2d at 540.
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having the account transferred to his wife in her own name. The donor had not
surrendered all control since he could write checks on the accounts without invad-
ing the legal rights of the donee. This case might be explained on the grounds
that a delivery in a causa mortis situation is less strict than in an inter vivos trans-
fer, but if this is true then the court seems to be admitting that delivery in a
causa mortis gift is merely additional evidence of the donor s intention and not an
absolute requisite to this type of transfer."'
The classical rule of delivery is still followed in Kentucky except in the
situations above noted, and the harsh results which strict adherence to such a rule
produce may be illustrated by the latest Kentucky case in which the doctrine was
considered. In Pikeville National Bank v. Shirley' the donor, contemplating
suicide, mailed his savings account passbook to the bank with instructions to
transfer the account to his sister. The passbook was not received by the bank
until several hours after the donor s death. The court ruled that since the donor
had the power to remove the letters from the mails upon application to the proper
authorities, that he had not surrendered complete control before his death and
therefore delivery was incomplete. The result in this case would seem unjust.
The donor had a right to dispose of his money as he wished. His intention to
dispose of it was clearly expressed. He attempted to give effect to this intention
and in his own mind the act was complete and the gift made. There was no
danger of fraud. Yet the court here usurped his right to deal with his property
as he wished and substituted the law of statutory descent, solely on the grounds
that no technical delivery was made.
The following is suggested as a possible solution to the dilemma which the
courts face in these cases. The classical doctrine of delivery should be replaced
by a more flexible and reasonable standard based on the donor s intention. The
courts, instead of applying the test of a technical delivery with its requirements
of absolute surrender of control and domimon, might well substitute the rule:
where the evidence is clear and convincing that the donor intended to make a
present, gratuitous, and absolute transfer of the chattel, and where there is no
reliable evidence of fraud or undue influence, the gift should be sustained.
This rule would embrace those cases in which either an actual, constructive or
symbolic delivery did in fact occur for in those cases the delivery itself is clear
and convincing evidence of the donor s intention. In addition the rule is broad
enough to include those cases m which the donor did some act short of a delivery
but consistant with his express intention to make a gift.
Under this rule the fact that the donor had the power of exercising some
control and dominon over the property may be properly considered as evidence
that the donor did not intend to make a present and absolute transfer, but these
u Tis view has been rationalized by some courts on the theory that in gifts
inter vivos the purpose of delivery is to confer possession and enjoyment of the
gift upon the donee and is for that reason an essential element of the gift. In
gifts causa mortis the purpose of delivery cannot be to give possession or enjoy-
ment since the gift, being testementary in character, is not complete until the
donor s death and so the only reason for requiring delivery is to prevent fraud
and to more fully show the donor s intention to give. Hence, delivery in causa
mortis gifts is not a constituent element of the gift, but merely evidence of the
donor s testementary intention. It follows, therefore, that such delivery is less
strict than in gifts inter vivaos. See Begovich v. Kruljac, 38 Wyo. 365, 267 Pac.
426 (1928); 59 PA. L. REv. 98 (1910).
281 Ky. 150, 135 S.W 2d 426 (1939).
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facts would not be controlling, as they are in a classical delivery, but would merely
be considered in relation to the other evidence in the case and weighed accord-
ingly. The donor is also protected from doing a heedless act because the evidence
must clearly show that his intention was to make an absolute gift. Where the
evidence shows the act was not meant to effect a gift the gift would fail. The
rule in addition demands that there be no evidence of fraud or undue influence
and so preserves within it the only valid reasons for continuing to require a
delivery.
This suggestion should have special significance to a jurisdiction such as Ken-
tucky where the decisions in some of the cases have gone beyond the orthodox
theories of constructive and symbolic delivery.
JAMES V MAcuRM
